China Airlines Flight 140: The “Deadly Go-Around”

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Aviation accidents rarely result from a single isolated failure. Instead, they often emerge from a complex interaction of human factors, technical limitations, operational decisions, and organizational shortcomings. The crash of China Airlines Flight 140 on April 26, 1994, at Nagoya Airport in Japan, is a tragic example of how these factors can combine with devastating consequences. The accident claimed 264 lives and became one of the deadliest aviation disasters in Japanese history.

What makes China Airlines Flight 140 particularly significant is the interaction between the flight crew and the aircraft’s automated flight control systems. During the final approach, an inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, followed by conflicting manual control inputs and automatic stabilizer trim commands, created a dangerous situation that the crew was unable to resolve. The accident highlighted critical issues involving automation awareness, cockpit procedures, aircraft system design, and pilot training.

In this article, we examine the events leading up to the crash, explain the technical and human factors that contributed to the accident, and explore the important aviation safety lessons that emerged from the investigation.

China Airlines Flight 140
China Airlines Flight 140
source: Guido Allieri

The Flight Day, 26 April 1994

On April 26, 1994, China Airlines Flight 140 was operating a scheduled international passenger service from Chiang Kai-shek International Airport (now Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport) in Taiwan to Nagoya Airport in Japan. The aircraft was an Airbus A300B4-622R, registered B-1816, carrying 271 people, including 256 passengers and 15 crew members.

The flight departed Taipei at 16:53 local time (17:53 Japan Standard Time). The flight crew consisted of Captain Wang Lo-chi, aged 42, and First Officer Chuang Meng-jung, aged 26. According to the official accident investigation, the aircraft climbed normally to its planned cruising altitude of 33,000 feet (FL330) and continued toward Nagoya without any reported significant difficulties.

As Flight 140 approached Japan, the crew began their descent toward Nagoya Airport. At approximately 20:07 local time, the aircraft was transferred to Nagoya Tower while conducting an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 34. Weather conditions were generally favorable, with good visibility and relatively light winds.

During the initial approach, the aircraft’s autopilot and autothrottle systems were engaged. However, after passing the outer marker and receiving landing clearance, the first officer, who was the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot and continued the approach manually.

Until this stage, the flight had progressed normally. However, during the final approach, an inadvertent activation of the aircraft’s go-around mode would initiate a sequence of events involving the flight crew and the automated flight control systems, ultimately leading to one of Japan’s deadliest aviation accidents.

The Final Approach: An Unintended Go-Around Mode Activation

As China Airlines Flight 140 approached Nagoya Airport on April 26, 1994, the flight crew was cleared for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 34. After passing the outer marker and receiving landing clearance, First Officer Chuang Meng-jung, who was the pilot flying, disengaged the autopilot and continued the approach manually.

While descending through approximately 1,000 feet, the first officer inadvertently activated the go-around switches, also known as the GO levers, on the thrust levers. This activated the aircraft’s automatic go-around thrust mode, causing an increase in engine thrust. As a result, the aircraft temporarily leveled off at approximately 1,040 feet and deviated above the ILS glide slope.

Captain Wang Lo-chi recognized that the go-around mode had been activated and instructed the first officer to correct the situation and return to the proper approach path. However, while attempting to regain the glide slope, the first officer engaged the autopilot, which subsequently operated in go-around mode.

This created a dangerous conflict between the pilots’ manual control inputs and the aircraft’s automatic flight control system. As the first officer pushed the control column forward to lower the aircraft’s nose and return to the glide slope, the autopilot commanded the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) progressively toward its nose-up limit.

Consequently, the elevator and horizontal stabilizer were effectively working against each other. While the pilots attempted to maintain the descent using nose-down elevator inputs, the automatic trim system continued moving the stabilizer in the opposite direction.

The crew did not adequately recognize the developing out-of-trim condition. This conflict between manual flight control inputs and automatic stabilizer trim commands would become one of the central factors in the loss of control that followed.

Go around definition and some reasons
Go Around definition and Some Reasons

The Final Moments: Loss of Control and Crash

As the aircraft continued its approach to Nagoya Airport, the conflict between the pilots’ manual control inputs and the autopilot’s stabilizer trim commands had created a severe out-of-trim condition. Even after the autopilot was disconnected, the horizontal stabilizer remained in an extreme nose-up position, making the aircraft increasingly difficult to control.

Captain Wang Lo-chi took over the controls and initially attempted to continue the landing. However, despite applying substantial nose-down control inputs and reducing engine thrust, he was unable to correct the aircraft’s increasing nose-up attitude. Recognizing that the approach could no longer be continued safely, the captain initiated a go-around.

The subsequent increase in engine thrust, combined with the existing nose-up stabilizer position and the retraction of the flaps and slats to the go-around configuration, caused the aircraft to climb steeply. Its pitch attitude eventually reached approximately 53 degrees, while airspeed decreased and the angle of attack increased. The aircraft subsequently entered an aerodynamic stall.

Following the stall, the aircraft’s nose dropped sharply, and the crew was unable to regain control. At approximately 20:15:45 local time on April 26, 1994, China Airlines Flight 140 crashed at Nagoya Airport. Of the 271 people on board, 264 lost their lives, including Captain Wang Lo-chi and First Officer Chuang Meng-jung. Only seven passengers survived.

The official investigation conducted by Japan’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission identified a combination of human errors, inadequate understanding of the aircraft’s automated flight control systems, and shortcomings in system design and crew training. The accident was not attributed to a single mechanical failure or an isolated pilot mistake, but rather to a sequence of interacting technical and human factors.

China Airlines Flight 140 remains one of the deadliest aviation accidents in Japanese history. Its investigation highlighted the importance of automation awareness, effective crew coordination, appropriate simulator training, and the need for aircraft systems to provide clear and predictable responses to pilot inputs. The tragedy continues to serve as an important case study in aviation safety and human–automation interaction.

Sources and Further Reading

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